### US CP 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government should modernize, through the widening and construction of new road infrastructure, the land port(s) of entry along the United States-Mexico border.

#### Building new US road infrastructure will decrease road congestion at point of entries and provide the necessary improvement to allow for the tripling of trade between the two countries. The plan will encourage Private Public partnerships that will garner legislative support

Erik Lee (serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for¶ Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University) and Christopher E. Wilson (is an Associate at the Mexico Institute of the¶ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.) May 2013 “The State of the Border Report A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

One of the most obvious and often cited ways to reduce congestion at the¶ POEs is to update and expand border crossing infrastructure, and credit is¶ certainly due to the U.S. government and border communities for significant¶ recent advances. After a decade with no new ports of entry built, three new¶ crossings were opened in 2010: Anzalduas, San Luís II, and Donna-Rio Bravo.14¶ In 2011, seven new lanes were opened on the World Trade Bridge, the most¶ important crossing point for commercial traffic between the United States and¶ Mexico. Significant expansions are also underway at San Ysidro, the most trafficked¶ crossing for individuals, and at Nogales-Mariposa. Despite these important¶ advances, much work remains to be done. Average U.S. land¶ POEs are more than forty years¶ old, with some over seventy years¶ old.15 Customs and Border Protection believes that “federal appropriations¶ have not kept pace with¶ needs,” noting $6 billion dollars of investment are needed to “fully modernize” the land ports of entry¶ along the United States’ southern¶ and northern borders.16¶ Given the fact that POE improvements¶ offer significant and tangible monetary benefits to border¶ communities and trade-dependent¶ industries, state, local and¶ private entities are often willing¶ to contribute funding to border¶ infrastructure projects. Under the¶ current budgetary constraints, it makes sense for federal agencies to take full advantage of these alternative funding sources. Along the Texas-Mexico border,¶ the majority of POEs are owned by the city or county in which they are located.¶ This model for infrastructure investment could be expanded along other parts¶ of the U.S.-Mexico border, but changes to current federal legislation appear to¶ be necessary to allow CBP to “accept reimbursement from sources other than¶ Congress.”17 As demonstrated above, additional staffing is and will be increasingly¶ necessary as trade increases. With the active support of border stakeholders¶ across the region, a proposal along these lines designed in collaboration¶ with federal agencies could likely garner legislative support and could open¶ significant opportunities for investment despite tough budgetary times.

#### US investment in POE roads solidifies the private public partnerships offsetting the cost to the USFG and lead to new infrastructure development in Mexico

Negroponte, 12/3/12 – Diana [Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution] “[F]acilitate the anticipated tripling of cross-border trade,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas 12/3/12 accessed: 2/5/13 DR http://www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoints-what-should-top-priority-be-us-mexican-relations

Deepening the trade relationship and facilitating the shipment of component parts between Mexico and the United States requires the creation of access roads some eight miles ahead of the principal border crossings. With electronic submission of customs/immigration documentation and with electronic seals on transnational containers, trucks filled with bilaterally manufactured products can more rapidly pass across the border. Currently, the trucks are delayed principally for lack of access roads leading up to the border, especially on the Mexican side. ¶ In order to construct these roads, private-public partnerships are needed. The NADBANK, established 20 years ago to support environmental projects, is the best placed to mobilize these partnerships. The bank's bylaws permit this. However, the environmental impact needs to be interpreted broadly. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could recognize that new roads relieve the congestion and high levels of air pollutants at the border crossing itself. Use of access roads may spread pollution further inland, but the levels of pollutants will be significantly lower than those currently suffered each side of the Rio Grande.¶ NADBANK’s initiative and the White House leadership to facilitate EPA approval could lead to the development of access roads and decongestion at the actual border. Mexican presidential encouragement to NADBANK's directors to seek PPPs and U.S. presidential urging to the EPA for a broad interpretation of its mandate could result in a decade's work of new infrastructure projects. This will facilitate the anticipated tripling of cross-border trade as both countries negotiate a Trans-Pacific Partnership and Mexico negotiates a Pacific Trade Alliance with its South American partners. ¶ Presidential decisions to advance on instructing NADBANK to move forward with PPPs for these infrastructure projects are relatively easy. Their consequences will enhance the trade and prosperity of both nations.

### US POE bad

#### Specifically, Congestion due to inadequate infrastructure at point of entries (POEs) potential to derail US/Mexico trade worth 6 billion and jack job growth and dooms US competitiveness

Erik Lee (serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for¶ Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University) and Christopher E. Wilson (is an Associate at the Mexico Institute of the¶ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.) May 2013 “The State of the Border Report A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Two major events have transformed the dynamics of bilateral trade and border¶ management over the past few decades, and an important third one may be underway.¶ The implementation of the¶ North American Free Trade Agreement¶ (NAFTA) in 1994 eliminated¶ most tariffs and caused bilateral¶ trade to skyrocket. Merchandise¶ trade has more than quintupled¶ since NAFTA was put in place, but¶ its growth has not been entirely¶ steady. After the terrorist attacks of¶ 9/11 and the accession of China to¶ the WTO in 2001, regional trade and¶ manufacturing sputtered. The need¶ for increased vigilance at the U.S.¶ borders came at a cost for regional manufacturers and border communities.6¶ Longer and unpredictable wait times at the border cut away at the competitiveness¶ of regional industries and many U.S. and Mexican factories were offshored¶ to Asia.7 Whereas bilateral trade had grown at a rate of 17 percent per year from¶ 1993-2000, it only grew 4.5 percent per year from 2000-2008.¶ The recent economic crisis has drawn attention to the serious need for efforts¶ to increase the competiveness of regional industry that could lead to a renewed¶ emphasis on the trade facilitation portion of the Customs and Border¶ Protection mission. The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing¶ sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance¶ regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers¶ to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as¶ rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever¶ greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided¶ to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking¶ advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade¶ dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly,¶ growing significantly faster than trade with China.8 As demonstrated in the ¶ above map (Figure 2), the growth of trade adds pressure (and has the potential to¶ add additional pressure) on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors.¶ Despite growing trade, the number of trucks crossing the border has remained¶ relatively stable since the year 2000. As shown in Figure 3 above, personal¶ vehicle and pedestrian traffic shows an even starker contrast, with a clear¶ inflection point around the turn of the century. Several studies have attempted¶ to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the¶ United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented¶ and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies¶ have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather¶ than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the¶ studies (summarized in Table 2, on next page) are quite varied, and too much¶ value should not be placed on any single number. Nonetheless, one message¶ comes through quite clearly—long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs¶ are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars¶ each year.

### Trade solvency

#### A. The United States and Mexico are set for robust economic growth – Failure to expand the border infrastructure will undercut economic growth in the US and Mexico, destroy US manufacturing competitiveness, and drive more than 6 billion jobs to Asia

Christopher Wilson 13, New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations,” January 2013 online google.Christopher [associate with the Mexico Institute] “Wilson Center January 2013 accessed: 2/5/13 DR http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context, or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term. Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be. The United States and Mexico have become profoundly integrated, and the two countries are now partners, rather than competitors, in the global economy. The North American Free Trade Agreement, geographic proximity, and the complementary nature of the two economies have fostered an integrated manufacturing platform. The United States and Mexico do not only trade finished products; they build them together. Indeed, roughly 40 percent of all content in Mexican exports to the United States originates in the United States, much more than the comparable figures with China, Brazil, and India, at four, three, and two percent respectively. Only Canada, at 25 percent, is similar. As a result, improvements in productivity in either country, as well as advances that lower the costs of moving goods across the border (i.e.: long wait times, inefficient customs procedures), strengthen the competitiveness of manufacturers throughout the whole region. An Evolving Context The Advent of Advanced Manufacturing and the Return of North American Competitiveness Driven by a series of global developments and technological advances, a manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. After many companies moved their factories to Asia in search of cheap wages over the past two decades, new trends are pulling production facilities back to North America. A manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. 6 While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider nearshoring in Mexico or reshoring their production back to the United Sates. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination. Mexico on the Move For years, Mexico oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s largest market. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Measures of the country’s manufacturing sector are showing record-high growth, a clear sign of strengthening competitiveness, and the country is building ever more complex products like cars while leaving behind simpler industries like textiles and shoemaking. Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products and a force for many of the economic and political reforms needed to unleash Mexico’s full economic potential.5 4 At a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can provide a boost to the U.S. economy. 8 Altogether, Mexico’s new government inherited a very solid economic outlook despite the complex global environment, and the recent passage of important labor and education reforms suggest that the political gridlock that blocked the passage of several key economic reforms in congress for years may have finally, if perhaps only temporarily, become unstuck. Recent optimism regarding the Mexican economy has attracted significant foreign investments, and the United Nations expects FDI in Mexico in 2013 to reach a record $38 billion dollars.6 The Peña Nieto administration currently looks poised to manage a period of robust growth, and while global developments or a failure to measure up to high expectations could create downward pressures on Mexico’s growth, if Congress passes key energy, fiscal and accountability reforms, the outlook could become even brighter. A Boom in Bilateral Trade After years of slow growth (4.5 percent average annual growth from 2000-2008) and then a 17 percent drop between 2008 and 2009 during the Great Recession, U.S.-Mexico trade is now booming as never before. It is growing faster than U.S. trade with China and faster than during any period during the post NAFTA spurt in the 1990s.7 In the uncertain context of a global economy in search of a new equilibrium—Europe struggling, China’s decelerating, a fiscal reckoning in the United States—the U.S.-Mexico merchandise trade (exports plus imports) grew at an average annual growth rate of 24 percent from 2009-2011, while U.S.-China trade had 17 percent AAG. Author’s calculations with data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 2012. 2009-2012 Average Annual GDP Growth Mexico: 4.4% United States: 2.3% The amazing thing is that this recent boom in bilateral trade has occurred without a strategy. Imagine what could be achieved if the governments of the United States and Mexico designed and implemented a comprehensive plan to improve the competitiveness of our region in the global marketplace. 9 bilateral economic relationship stands out as a pillar of strength and perhaps a signpost on the path to a stronger economic region. U.S.-Mexico trade already supports more than six million U.S. jobs, and the return of manufacturing competitiveness to the region, as well as the robust growth of the Mexican economy, presents an opportunity to significantly increase export supported employment should steps be taken to support further advances in North American competitiveness.8 The amazing thing is that this recent boom in bilateral trade has occurred without a strategy. Imagine what could be achieved if the governments of the United States and Mexico—ideally in conjunction with Canada—designed and implemented a comprehensive plan to improve the competitiveness of our region in the global marketplace. A Regional Competitiveness Agenda To cash in on the trends bringing competitiveness back to North America in a way that significantly boosts economic growth and job creation, significant policy action is needed by both the United States and Mexico. At the domestic level, each country must work through its own complex political landscape to press through key reforms, including but not limited to education and fiscal reform in both nations; competition, rule of law and energy in Mexico; and a revamp of the U.S. immigration system so that it attracts and retains the world’s top talent. The opportunities for U.S.-Mexico collaboration outlined below go hand in hand with these domestic efforts, supporting regional manufacturers and service providers so they can successfully compete in domestic and international markets. Taken together, they have the potential to truly revitalize the regional economy. 8 Christopher Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2011. 10 Strengthening Competitiveness through Integration The first step to improving regional competitiveness is freeing up the flow of trade within the region. As the central architecture of North American economic relations, NAFTA has spurred huge growth in regional trade and investment. Unfortunately, even as bilateral trade skyrocketed, the United States and Mexico did not make the infrastructure investments or policy advances needed to efficiently move what now amounts to more than a billion dollars’ worth of goods back and forth across the U.S. Mexico border each day. Since the U.S. and Mexico build products together, materials and parts that are used as inputs for production often zig-zag back and forth across the border several times as a product is being made. This means that the bottom line of regional manufacturers is negatively impacted in a magnified way by any inefficiency in moving goods between the two countries. The section of this report on border management describes the challenges and solutions in greater detail, but, in short, the advances in border security made after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 came at a price. Long and unpredictable wait times now chip away at the competitiveness of the region. Thankfully, an innovative set of border management concepts, endorsed by the presidents of the United States and Mexico in the 21st Century Border initiative in 2010, has the potential to simultaneously strengthen security and efficiency. Some important advances on the implementation of those concepts have been achieved, but the lines at the border remain long and there is much work to do.

### Competiveness Impact

#### First, US competiveness

#### A. Competitiveness is key to leadership

Rocco Martino (Ph.D. in astrophysics from the Institute of Aerospace Studies, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute) Spring 2007 “A Strategy for Success: Innovation Will Renew American Leadership”, Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 2

Much of the foreign policy discussion in the United States today is focused upon the dilemma posed by the Iraq War and the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. These problems are, of course, both immediate and important. However, America also faces other challenges to its physical security and economic prosperity, and these are more long-term and probably more profound. There is, first, the threat posed by our declining competitiveness in the global economy, a threat most obviously represented by such rising economic powers as China and India.1 There is, second, the threat posed by our increasing dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. Moreover, these two threats are increasingly connected, as China and India themselves are greatly increasing their demand for Middle East oil.2 The United States of course faced great challenges to its security and economy in the past, most obviously from Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century and from the Soviet Union in the second half. Crucial to America's ability to prevail over these past challenges was our technological and industrial leadership, and especially our ability to continuously recreate it. Indeed, the United States has been unique among great powers in its ability to keep on creating and recreating new technologies and new industries, generation after generation. Perpetual innovation and technological leadership might even be said to be the American way of maintaining primacy in world affairs. They are almost certainly what America will have to pursue in order to prevail over the contemporary challenges involving economic competitiveness and energy dependence.

#### B. Specifically key to US benign leadership – Solves your impact turns

Richard Armitage (Former Deputy Secretary of State) and Joseph Nye (Professor of Political Science at Harvard) December 12 2007 “Why So Angry, America?” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IL12Df01.html

The world is dissatisfied with American leadership. Shocked and frightened after September 11, 2001, we put forward an angry face to the globe, not one that reflected the more traditional American values of hope and optimism, tolerance and opportunity. This fearful approach has hurt the United States' ability to bring allies to its cause, but it is not too late to change. The nation should embrace a smarter strategy that blends our "hard" and "soft" power - our ability to attract and persuade, as well as our ability to use economic and military might. Whether it is ending the crisis in Pakistan, winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, deterring Iran's and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, managing China's rise or improving the lives of those left behind by globalization, the US needs a broader, more balanced approach. Lest anyone think that this approach is weak or naive, remember that Defense Secretary Robert Gates used a major speech on November 26 "to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use 'soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power". We - one Republican, one Democrat - have devoted our lives to promoting American pre-eminence as a force for good in the world. But the US cannot stay on top without strong and willing allies and partners. Over the past six years, too many people have confused sharing the burden with relinquishing power. In fact, when we let others help, we are extending US influence, not diminishing it. Since September 11, the war on terrorism has shaped this isolating outlook, becoming the central focus of US engagement with the world. The threat from terrorists with global reach is likely to be with us for decades. But unless they have weapons of mass destruction, groups such as al-Qaeda pose no existential threat to the US - unlike our old foes Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In fact, al-Qaeda and its ilk hope to defeat us by using our own strength against us. They hope that we will blunder, overreact and turn world opinion against us. This is a deliberately set trap, and one whose grave strategic consequences extend far beyond the costs this nation would suffer from any small-scale terrorist attack, no matter how individually tragic and collectively painful. We cannot return to a nearsighted pre-September 11 mindset that underestimated the al-Qaeda threat, but neither can we remain stuck in a narrow post-September 11 mindset that alienates much of the world. More broadly, when our words do not match our actions, we demean our character and moral standing. We cannot lecture others about democracy while we back dictators. We cannot denounce torture and waterboarding in other countries and condone it at home. We cannot allow Cuba's Guantanamo Bay or Iraq's Abu Ghraib to become the symbols of American power. The United States has long been the big kid on the block, and it will probably remain so for years to come. But its staying power has a great deal to do with whether it is perceived as a bully or a friend. States and non-state actors can better address today's challenges when they can draw in allies; those who alienate potential friends stand at greater risk. The past six years have demonstrated that hard power alone cannot secure the nation's long-term goals. The US military remains the best in the world, even after having been worn down from years of war. We will have to invest in people and materiel to maintain current levels of readiness; as a percentage of gross domestic product, US defense spending is actually well below Cold War levels. But an extra dollar spent on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar's worth of security. After all, security threats are no longer simply military threats. China is building two coal-fired power plants each week. US hard power will do little to curb this trend, but US-developed technology can make Chinese coal cleaner, which helps the environment and opens new markets for American industry. In a changing world, the US should become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good - by providing things that people and governments want but cannot attain without US leadership. By complementing US military and economic strength with greater investments in soft power, Washington can build the framework to tackle tough global challenges. We call this smart power. Smart power is not about getting the world to like us. It is about developing a strategy that balances our hard (coercive) power with our soft (attractive) power. During the Cold War, the US deterred Soviet aggression through investments in hard power. But as Gates noted late last month, US leaders also realized that "the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions - many of them non-military". So the US used its soft power to rebuild Europe and Japan and to establish the norms and institutions that became the core of the international order for the past half-century. The Cold War ended under a barrage of hammers on the Berlin Wall rather than a barrage of artillery across the Fulda Gap precisely because of this integrated approach.

#### C. US leadership solves all other impacts – collapse of primacy results in nuclear war

Thayer, 2006 (Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis)

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

### Economy impact

#### A. Port of entry are key to US-Mexico trade – accounts for 70% of total trade – trade key to the global and US economy – new infrastructure investment is critical to maintain the trade routes

Erik Lee (serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for¶ Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University) and Christopher E. Wilson (is an Associate at the Mexico Institute of the¶ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.) May 2013 “The State of the Border Report A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet underappreciated—¶ success stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico¶ goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with¶ virtually no recognition.1 The United States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—¶ which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over¶ the last two decades—is the United States’ second largest export market and third¶ largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border¶ via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where “the rubber hits the road”¶ for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but¶ also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border¶ management.¶ Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods¶ and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of¶ bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for¶ greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of¶ the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long¶ and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion¶ acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and¶ Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security¶ and efficiency at the same time. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative¶ by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this¶ direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled.¶ Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of¶ entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither¶ efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more¶ resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less,¶ improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler¶ and shipper programs (i.e. SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT, Global Entry) allow vetted,¶ low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Improving¶ these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase¶ throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing—all while¶ strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown¶ and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments.

#### B. No alt causes, US-Mexico trade key to overall US and GLOBAL economies – Ports of entry must be updated to maintain expected trade increases, without continued economic gains will be lost

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Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great yet¶ highly underappreciated success stories of the global economy. The United¶ States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—which has made enormous¶ strides in its macroeconomic picture in the last two decades—is the United¶ States’ third-ranked partner in terms of total trade.¶ The economic vitality of the U.S.-Mexico border region—which includes manufacturing,¶ infrastructure, human capital and tourism, among other elements—is¶ a key part of this overall economic success. With more than a billion dollars of¶ commercial traffic crossing the border each day, it is literally at the U.S.-Mexico¶ border region where the rubber hits the road in terms of this expanded regional¶ trade. This is because more than 70% of total binational commerce passes¶ through the border region via trucks. This already massive truck traffic is expected¶ to increase significantly in the coming decades (see Figure 2 below).¶ Since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in¶ 1994, total trade between the two countries has more than quintupled, and¶ goods and services trade is now at a half trillion dollars per year. An estimated¶ six million U.S. jobs and probably even more Mexican jobs depend on¶ bilateral trade.2¶ The six Mexican and four U.S. border states have especially close bilateral economic¶ ties, but what is often unappreciated is that this economic value extends¶ far beyond the border region. Mexico, for example, is the top buyer of exports¶ from states as far away as New Hampshire (mostly computers and electronics).¶ In fact, Mexico is the first or second most important export market for¶ twenty-one states from Colorado to Ohio, and twenty U.S. states sell more¶ than a billion dollars’ worth of goods to Mexico each year. The United States is¶ an even more important market for Mexican exports. Seventy-nine percent of¶ Mexican exports are sold to the United States, including products produced in¶ the border region and throughout the country.3 Crude oil, for example, which is¶ mostly produced in Mexico’s Gulf Coast states, is the top single export to the¶ United States, but automobiles and auto-parts, which make up an even greater¶ share of exports when taken together, are¶ mainly made in the center and north of¶ the country.4¶ The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is impressive,¶ but its quality makes it unique.¶ The United States and Mexico do not just¶ sell goods to one another, they actually¶ work together to manufacture them.¶ Through a process known as production¶ sharing, materials and parts often cross¶ back and forth between factories on each¶ side of the border as a final product is¶ made and assembled. As a result, U.S.¶ imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexico’s¶ imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content ¶ This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it¶ means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience¶ growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side¶ of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness¶ on the other side as well. In sum, we will¶ largely succeed or fail together and must¶ therefore join forces to increase the competitiveness¶ of the region. Second, the fact¶ that goods often cross the border several¶ times as they are being produced creates¶ a multiplier effect for gains and losses in¶ border efficiency. Whereas goods from¶ China only go through customs and inspection¶ once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico,¶ products built by regional manufacturers¶ bear the costs of long and unpredictable¶ border wait times and significant customs¶ requirements each time they cross the¶ U.S.-Mexico border.¶ Leading industrial sectors in U.S.-Mexico trade include automobiles, aerospace,¶ home appliances, and medical devices, to name but a few. We often find¶ extremely high-skilled labor involved in complex aspects of U.S.-Mexico trade,¶ including custom parts, metal work and products requiring skilled labor. These¶ processes often link designers, developers, raw materials producers and parts¶ manufacturers in the United States to high skilled labor, engineers, and plant¶ managers in Mexico. While in truth both countries participate in all parts of the¶ supply chain depending on the product, these are some broad characteristics¶ that often hold true for which parts of the manufacturing process each country¶ specializes in.¶ In addition to manufactured goods, agricultural products also flow between¶ the two countries. This includes U.S. exports of food products (grains and¶ processed foods) from states such as South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa, as ¶ well as Mexican fruit and vegetable exports from key states such as Sinaloa and¶ Michoacán.¶ As a final point to introduce this macro view of U.S.-Mexico trade, it must be¶ emphasized that this trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function¶ effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor,¶ links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast,¶ and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs).¶ Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects¶ western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of¶ Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California¶ to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it¶ is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure—and the land¶ ports of entry that serve as nodes in this network—will experience added stress¶ (see Figure 2). ¶ Tourism is another key economic driver for the region. Mexico is the number¶ one foreign destination for U.S. tourists, and Mexican tourists comprise the¶ second largest group of foreign visits to the United States each year (see Table¶ 1 below). Statistics on Mexican tourist spending in the U.S. are incomplete¶ because of the heavy usage of U.S. bank cards and cash by Mexican tourists,¶ thereby making statistical analysis of this group of tourists particularly challenging.¶ Yet even with this incomplete picture, Mexican tourist spending ranks¶ fourth, according to U.S. Department of Commerce statistics from 2010. ¶ The large majority (85%) of Mexican arrivals to the U.S. occur at the land ports¶ of entry along our shared border. These tourists have a significant economic¶ impact upon the communities they visit and the states that receive sales and¶ other taxes they pay. To take one example, according to a study by the University of Arizona on Mexican visitors to Arizona, in 2007-08 Mexican visitors spent¶ $2.69 billion in the state of Arizona, generating 23,400 direct jobs and 7,000¶ indirect jobs in the state.¶ It is the land ports of entry, then, that play the pivotal role in facilitating commercial¶ exchange between the United States and Mexico. The health of both the¶ national economies and the more local border-specific economies rests upon¶ the relative health or weakness of these gateways.

#### C. Economic collapse causes a cutback in defense spending which collapses deterrence and global war

Friedberg And Schoenfeld, 10/21/08 (Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, and Gabriel, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J.; “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership. Are we up for the task? The American economy has historically demonstrated remarkable resilience. Our market-oriented ideology, entrepreneurial culture, flexible institutions and favorable demographic profile should serve us well in whatever trials lie ahead. The American people, too, have shown reserves of resolve when properly led. But experience after the Cold War era -- poorly articulated and executed policies, divisive domestic debates and rising anti-Americanism in at least some parts of the world -- appear to have left these reserves diminished. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on World Affairs found that 36% of respondents agreed that the U.S. should "stay out of world affairs," the highest number recorded since this question was first asked in 1947. The economic crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

#### D. Strong statistical studies prove Economic decline increases the risk of war

Jedidiah Royal 2010, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 10, . 213-215— Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.